Meaningful definitions of and distinctions between airline business models are not easily formulated, particularly when one considers the extremely dynamic nature of the industry. The paper outlines a product and organizational architecture (POA) approach to classifying and relating key elements of airline business models. Using indices to create benchmark metrics, the POA model is then used to examine and compare six European airlines. The analysis shows that there are important differences in the business models of airlines who are all commonly referred to as 'low cost carriers'. The paper demonstrates how differences in the business models adopted by the different airlines contribute to their relative profitability.
1.

Introduction
Much has been written about the low cost airline business model and what elements in the business model distinguish it from traditional full service airlines. Williams and Mason (2004) reviewed the group of strategies that together enable low cost carriers to exercise cost advantages over full service airlines (p.8) (see also Francis, et.al, 2003) . The review highlighted significant differences between low cost carriers in their business models. For some carriers it is not clear if they should be called "low cost carrier", "regional carrier", or some other term. When comparing airline performance it is useful to compare one airline with others of a similar business approach and contrast it with other airline pursuing alternative models. However, the fundamental problem is that is a lack of a consistent and standardised approach to analysing airline business models. This paper seeks to go someway towards rectifying this methodological gap.
Product and organizational architecture
Synthesizing complex airline business models requires the identification of key components of the product architecture -the service quality elements that define the product relative to consumer preferences, and organizational architecture -the vertical structure, production and distribution choices of the airline. A conceptual framework can be developed to consider both the product and organisational architecture of firms. Such a product and organizational architecture (POA) approach can be applied directly to airline business models. Figure 1 illustrates the general POA approach to defining a firm's business model and its competitive environment. On the one hand, product architecture gives rise to a core product bundle that positions the firm in terms of consumer preferences (benefit drivers) and the competitive environment (as defined by the market structure). On the other hand, the product design also implies a choice set for inputs and possible organizational structures (cost drivers) which define the firm's cost position. Taken together, both product and organizational architecture contribute to the creation and sustainability of profits. Figure 2 shows an application of the POA approach to airline business models. By so doing we aim to develop a means by which airlines can be consistently compared. Product architecture is separated into three elements of service quality:
Applying the POA model to airlines
connectivity, convenience and comfort. These three elements have the property that they follow a general ordering with respect to the degree with which costs are fixed or 'avoidable'. In particular, connectivity implies a choice of network design that distinguishes hub-and-spoke (airline-supplied connectivity)
from point-to-point (passenger-supplied) networks. This is perhaps the most important core element that can distinguish between different airline business models.
Some of the elements of convenience are linked to network structure decisions, but nevertheless imply a lesser degree of fixed investment for some airlines. In particular, use of primary airports and 'checked-through' baggage services tend to follow from the choice of a hub-and-spoke network, however an airline operating a point-point network may also choose to offer convenience through use of a primary airport.
Elements of comfort in determining the quality of service are to some degree more variable than the other two categories, yet these elements will vary in importance for the overall architecture of the product. In some markets elements of comfort might be regarded as 'frills' while in other markets the same elements could be regarded as more essential; the offering of in-flight meals on short haul versus long-haul flights for example. The 3Cs thus define the product in relation to consumer preferences, which impacts market demand within the competitive environment. However the 3Cs also impact the magnitude and avoidability of production costs which in turn affects pricing flexibility and the airline's competitive position.
Organizational architecture
Within the organizational architecture the size and composition of the fleet along with the organizational design are elements that follow on primarily from the product architecture. In particular, the decision over network structure is key because the complexity of operating a hub-and-spoke network requires certain functions relating to coordination, yield management, etc. which implies a more vertically integrated organization. In contrast, an airline operating a point-to-point network has relatively more opportunities to form a 'nexus of contracts' organizational structure in which many functions are contracted out.
In terms of distribution, all airlines now take advantage of internet based booking
systems, yet even here point-to-point network carriers can offer more simplicity in the process with implications for both cost and benefit drivers FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Using indices to form benchmark metrics in the POA model
In an attempt to functionalise the conceptual POA model, a dataset of benchmark metrics has been developed. By developing separate indices for different elements in the business model the interaction between the items and the importance of each item to the overall performance of each airline can be more easily identified and their impact on the overall performance assessed.
The indices were developed for each of the following areas:
The profitability index was constructed using just the operating ratio of the carriers in the benchmark group.
While profitability identifies the overall success of the business, an airline's unit cost Some airlines position themselves as providing a more convenient service by having a higher frequency of service, using airports either better located or with better surface transport links than those offered to alternative airports. They also promote a punctual service, and offer improved baggage services. For the Convenience Index the following benchmarks were included; the average weekly frequency per route 2 , the weighted average distance of the airport served to the city centre; the proportion of flights offered from primary airports, the proportion of flights departed on within 15 minutes, and the Skytrax 3 baggage score.
To measure on-board comfort the seat pitch and seat width was included in the Comfort Index. The average number of passengers per flight was also included with fewer passengers per flight assumed to be more comfortable than more
4
. The 2 While this benchmark statistic is also included in the connectivity index it is also a clear measure of convenience.
3 Skytrax ratings for baggage handling for General handling, on-board baggage policy, excess baggage policy were aggregated and used for this rating. 4 Although it is recognised that, depending on the type of aircraft equipment, smaller aircraft are not necessarily more comfortable for passengers than larger aircraft. increase employee productivity and this ratio is also included in this index. To recognize and try to reflect the effect of outsourcing that might otherwise inflate the employees productivity ratings, the passengers per employee ratio has been deflated by the percentage of total costs are accounted for by employee costs. This proportion may be considered a proxy measure for amount of outsourcing that a company does. If the proportion of employee costs over total costs is small then it is more likely that the airline outsourced operational activities, whereas an airline with a higher proportion of employee costs over total costs are likely to have undertaken more operational activities in-house. The authors recognize the potential flaws using this ratio to adjust the benchmark labour productivity variable (i.e. one airline pays considerably lower wages), however outsourcing is a significant part of the low cost model and the degree to which an airline outsources is very difficult to measure from published sources. Therefore this proxy for outsourcing is used to deflate labour productivity measures.
One of the key sources of lower costs that some low cost carriers have been able to achieve has been in airport charges. The Airport Attractiveness Index attempts to rate the airlines' success at managing this cost item. Four benchmark variables are included. Firstly the airport/en-route cost per passenger is calculated.
Secondly, smaller airports are likely to offer lower landing fees and thus a variable is included for the weighted average annual passengers at the airport. Where an LCC operates to an airport with higher number of full service carriers present the opportunity to negotiate lower fares is reduced, and thus the third variable included is the weighted average number of full service carriers at the airports served.
Finally the percent of city pair routes that are monopolies provides a measure of how important the airline is to the airport and thus a measure of negotiating power.
The final index provides a measure of the market structures that each airline operates within. The median and average HHI scores are calculated across each airline's network. This Market Structure Index also incorporates the average number of competitors per route each airline faces, the average city size served and the average share of capacity (by seats) per route.
Index calculation methodology
To demonstrate the use of the POA model to consistently compare airline business models it was applied to the European LCC sector using six sample airlines. The airlines considered were; EasyJet, Ryanair, Norwegian, Flybe, SkyEurope and Air shown that the interaction between the various elements described above in the business model tend to be lost in the benchmarking process by aggregating items together. Consequently, here a number of separate indices have been developed.
The methodology adopted to calculate the eleven index scores per airline is based on "best in class" performance by the sample airlines for each item benchmarked.
For most benchmarks the highest score represents the "best in class" -e.g. ASKs per employee -if each employee produces a large number of ASKs the 5 www.rati.com performance of the airline's employee productivity is likely to be high. In some cases the "best in class" is the lowest score -e.g the airline that achieves the lowest unit costs per ASK in the benchmark pool is clearly the "best in class". In some cases the directional preference of the benchmark is not obvious and a value judgment is required. For example, when considering network density it is not clear whether the best airline is the one that has the highest or lowest network density. In this case the "best in class" is considered to be the airline with the highest benchmark statistic and the aggregate index is used to see further examine the impact of the network decisions on the performance of the airline. 
Calculation of Maximum "Best in Class" Index
The following calculation procedures were applied to calculate each Index. For items that for which the highest score was considered "Best in Class" the following the highest score was identified. For each airline (and for each year) a ratio was calculated for dividing the airline's performance by the "best in class" value.
Benchmark Ratio = Airline's performance/Best in class performance
Here the top mark available will be 1.0 and this will be achieved by the "best in In other words easyJet's operating profit performance is 79% that of Ryanair's.
Calculation of Minimum "Best in Class" Index
For calculating a benchmark ratio for items where a minimum value was considered the "best of class" the ratio was constructed to place the performance of the individual airline on a continuum from "best in class" to "worst in class" Here the worst performer in the benchmark group will achieve a zero benchmark ratio. The advantage of this approach is that it draws all airlines within the benchmark sample group across a range from zero (the worst) to one (the best).
Due to the requirement to include a "worst in class" value in the calculation to establish the range of values the ratio indicates where in that spectrum of performance each airline is. In this case easyJet's performance is 73% along the spectrum for worst to best.
Application of Weighting
In the calculation of each index it was felt appropriate that some items in each index made a greater contribution to the final index and therefore a weighting process was applied. The weights were based on a correlation of the benchmark item against profitability. The range of weight values can be from zero to one with one carrying the greatest weight. For each index a calculation is made to apply the weight to each benchmark ratio item and then a total is summed.
Weighted score = ((scorea * weighti)+(scoreb * weightii)+…+(scorez * weightn))/weights i-n
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Calculation of Final Index
This final indexing places all airlines in relationship with the best performer in the area of analysis (such as Cost, Profitability, or Revenue, etc.). The score is calculated by establishing a ratio of the weighted score for each airline over the highest/best weighted score.
Final Index = Weighted Score/Best Weighted Score*10
The results of the index calculations for the sampled airlines in the table below. 
Analysis of Indices
By calculating separate indices for different areas of the business model, it is possible to develop a correlation matrix (Table 4) .
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The matrix reveals some interesting relationships. While cost is, as expected for low cost carriers, correlated with profitability (with a correlation coefficient of 0.27), the poor profitability of SkyEurope (which ironically has very low costs) has drawn down the correlation from 0.54 if they had been excluded from the benchmark group. The labour index is highly correlated with profitability (0.86). As for most airlines, labour is the single largest controllable cost it is not surprising that those airlines that are best at getting high productivity from their labour will be more likely to be profitable. Indeed there is a very high correlation between the cost and labour indicies indicating that low cost airlines that achieve high labour productivity are a long way toward ensuring low costs. Aircraft productivity is also highly correlated to profitability indicating that a successful low cost carrier will work its aircraft assets very hard. Two indicies that are reasonably well correlated to profitability is connectivity and airports (with correlation coefficients of 0.47 and 0.59 respectively). The airlines in the benchmark group that have the best profitability tend also to have larger networks, offer more routes or have higher density networks. The airline with the best profitability (Ryanair) also has a large proportion of monopoly routes in small, secondary networks and face limited competition from full service carriers.
Two key indicies that are inversely correlated to profitability for this panel of benchmark low cost carriers are convenience and comfort, whilst being correlated with the revenue index. This would suggest that in the low cost sector providing additional levels of comfort to customers and chasing higher yielding passengers does not attain the best financial rewards. The high inverse correlation between the revenue and cost indicies seem to suggest that the pursuit of higher yields and lower cost are mutually exclusive. In this airline sector carriers need to focus on costs and productivity rather than moving into a middle ground where higher levels of comfort and higher yields are provided and sought.
Key findings on the low cost carrier sector revealed by application of the POA model
The original concept for this research was to highlight the point that airlines that called themselves "low cost" did not necessarily have the lowest costs, and that within the sector a number of different business models were being practiced. The concept was extended to highlight differences in business models. In an earlier working paper (Morrison and Mason, 2007) we concluded that more than one LCC model might be possible but more work was required on the indexes and the benchmark data that supports them. From here the POA concept was formulated to test this hypothesis. The two figures that follow lay out the index profiles of the six benchmark airlines in 2006. The further a carrier is toward the outermost point on a spoke the closer they are to being the best in class for that particular index. A score of 10 for a particular index means the airline is the best in class. We can see that Ryanair has a profile that is best in six of the eleven indexes (and as such it is also included in the second chart for reference). They are best in class for profitability, cost, distribution, labour, airport attractiveness, and market structure.
They are second best for aircraft productivity. It would seem therefore that, in this benchmarking exercise, Ryanair is best in delivering an organizational architecture that attains the best profitability. Part of that success leads to, and derives from, a market structure where they dominate the small markets that they serve. It is in the product architecture area where Ryanair is not the best in class. In fact, it is worst in class for Revenue, Comfort and Convenience. It would seem that the carriers that pursue revenues backed by additional comfort and convenience are those that have failed to achieve good profitability suggesting that such a model that is less successful in the low cost sector. Ryanair and EasyJet have been looking to extend their network and increase the number of routes offered. Ryanair, with its already low density strategy, has done so without further thinning its network density, however, easyJet's new strategy of network expansion has been at the cost of its route density and flight frequency.
During this period of new opportunities, first mover advantage would seem to have been important. However, it is still not clear at this time whether network connectivity is vital to the success of a LCC and it will be a couple of more year's before this becomes clear. 
Conclusion
Meaningful definitions of and distinctions between airline business models are not easily formulated, particularly when one considers the extremely dynamic nature of the industry. In order to provide a more coherent and consistent understanding of airline competition and strategy, we have applied a product and organizational architecture (POA) approach to classifying and relating key elements of airline business models.
The application of the POA model to six European airlines has shown that there are important differences in the business models of airlines who are all commonly referred to as 'low cost carriers'. Our paper demonstrates how differences in the business models adopted by the different airlines contribute to their profitability.
More specifically, amongst the sample airlines examined, our analysis suggests that the positioning of some airlines to offer increased comfort and convenience in a bid to achieve higher yields is marginally successful but is not as profitable as the pure low cost approach practised by Ryanair.
There may well be a first mover advantage enjoyed by Ryanair and EasyJet.
Certainly size and market power are shown to contribute to the POA strategy of both airlines. Yet, we can see that even between these two airlines, Ryanair stands alone as the lowest-cost carrier, providing some indication that strategically, when one airline establishes a lowest cost position in its product and organizational 
